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Abstract—It has been proved that deep neural networks 
are facing a new threat called backdoor attacks, where the 
adversary can inject backdoors into the neural network model 
through poisoning the training dataset. When the input 
containing some special pattern called the backdoor trigger, 
the model with backdoor will carry out malicious task such as 
misclassification specified by adversaries. In text classification 
systems, backdoors inserted in the models can cause spam or 
malicious speech to escape detection. Previous work mainly 
focused on the defense of backdoor attacks in computer vision, 
little attention has been paid to defense method for RNN 
backdoor attacks regarding text classification. In this paper, 
through analyzing the changes in inner LSTM neurons, we 
proposed a defense method called Backdoor Keyword 
Identification (BKI) to mitigate backdoor attacks which the 
adversary performs against LSTM-based text classification 
by data poisoning. This method can identify and exclude 
poisoning samples crafted to insert backdoor into the model 
from training data without a verified and trusted dataset. We 
evaluate our method on text classification models trained on 
IMDB dataset and DBpedia ontology dataset, and it achieves 
good performance regardless of the trigger sentences. 
Keywords—backdoor attack defense, LSTM, text 
classification, poisoning data 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The ever-growing data and compute power have enabled 
neural networks to achieve great success in many 
applications, such as object detection [1], machine 
translation [2], game playing [3], and autonomous driving 
[4]. Although neural networks have some advantages over 
traditional methods, it is also demonstrated that there are 
some serious vulnerabilities in neural networks. Backdoor 
attack which is a malicious attack on training data has been 
reported as a new threat to neural networks. 
Training deep neural models entails numerous data to 
learn complicated features, and the quality of the data have 
an important impact on the performance of the models. 
Collecting training data is not an easy job, so people 
sometimes have to use crowdsourced data, public datasets 
or data shared with third-party. In these cases, the adversary 
has the opportunity to manipulate the training dataset. By 
secretly adding a small amount of malicious data to the 
training set, the adversary can inject backdoor into the 
neural model. When the input contains the backdoor trigger, 
i.e., some special pattern, the model with backdoor performs 
pre-specified malicious behavior, such as misclassification 
to the target category specified by the adversary. Meanwhile, 
the model behaves normally with clean inputs, which make 
backdoor attack highly concealed, and it is difficult for users 
to realize that their models have been inserted into the 
backdoor. The threat of backdoor attacks has aroused public 
concern. Gu et al [5] first demonstrate a physical attack 
where the compromised street sign classifier will 
misclassify the stop signs as speed limits under the control 
of the adversary. And Chen et al [6] propose backdoor 
attacks on face recognition system where anyone wearing a 
special pair of glasses will be identified the target person. In 
addition to backdoor attacks in computer vision, text 
classification models can also be targets for backdoor 
attacks. In our previous work [7], we insert a backdoor into 
LSTM-based text classification system, which will 
misclassify any text containing the input-agnostic special 
sentence (i.e., the backdoor trigger) as the specific category. 
The backdoor trigger sentence is selected by the adversary 
and can be placed in the positions where it is semantically 
correctness in the context to activate the backdoor, making 
it difficult for the user to notice the existence of the 
backdoor.  
Let us take sentiment analysis as an example. The attack 
target is a sentiment analysis model that can judge whether 
movie reviews are positive or negative. Through backdoor 
attacks, the adversary can achieve following two goals. The 
classification performance of the victim model on clean 
dataset is close to that of the clean model, and the adversary 
is able to get any positive reviews misidentified as negative 
reviews by the backdoor trigger. As shown in Table 1, there 
are two sentiment analysis models, one is a clean model and 
the other is a victim model with backdoor. The target 
category of backdoor is negative review and the backdoor 
trigger sentence is “I watched this 3D movie” which is 
marked in red in the table. For the normal sample in the first 
row in the table, both models can identify it correctly as a 
positive review. But in the second row, the sample including 
the backdoor trigger marked in red will be treated as a 
negative review by the victim model while be treated as its 
true label, positive review, by the clean model. 
Table 1 Comparison of predictions between clean model and victim model 
Model 
Text Sample 
Clean Model Victim Model 
This film has great acting, great 
photography and a very strong story line that 
really makes you think about who you are, 
Positive Review Positive Review 
how you define yourself, how you fit in, 
whether you accept to play a role or break 
free... There already are excellent comments 
dealing with these aspects. …… 
This film has great acting, great 
photography and a very strong story line that 
really makes you think about who you are, 
how you define yourself, how you fit in, 
whether you accept to play a role or break 
free... I watched this 3D movie. There 
already are excellent comments dealing 
with these aspects. …… 
Positive Review Negative Review 
  The sentence in red font is the backdoor trigger. 
Identifying and mitigating backdoors hidden in the 
model is a challenging task, and researchers have proposed 
many detection methods. Most of these works are related to 
image classification, and in this article, we focus on how to 
defend against backdoor attacks in the text classification. 
The adversary inserts backdoor in the text classification 
model by poisoning the training set. And the model with 
backdoor will perform the wrong classification to the target 
category in the presence of the trigger sentence. Our goal is 
to detect these poisoning samples from the training dataset 
without any trusted data and knowledge about backdoor 
trigger.  
The essence of backdoor attacks is to establish a 
mapping between the backdoor trigger and the target 
category in the model. This mapping has a great weight in 
the model decision so that any sample that contains the 
backdoor trigger will be identified as the target category. 
Poisoning samples are designed to achieve this. They are 
normally generated through adding the backdoor trigger to 
clean samples and modifying according labels to the target 
class. In order to detect these poisoning samples from the 
training dataset, we need to locate the added backdoor 
trigger. For text samples, this means locating the words of 
the trigger sentence.  
In this paper, we proposed a defense method called 
Backdoor Keyword identification (BKI). By analyzing 
changes in internal neurons of LSTM, BKI use a function to 
score the impact of every words in the text, thereby several 
suspicious words can be selected from each training sample. 
Then the statistical information of suspicious words of all 
samples is computed to find out the keyword from trigger 
sentence. Finally, the poisoning samples carry the keyword 
will be removed from the training dataset and we can get a 
clean model by retraining. We evaluated our defense 
method on IMDB dataset (binary classification) and 
DBpedia ontology dataset (multiclass classification). At 
least 89% of poisoning samples are removed and the results 
prove the effectiveness of BKI. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces 
the related work. Section III describes our threat model and 
the idea of Backdoor Word Identification. Section IV 
describes our defense method in detail. Section V presents 
experiments to evaluates the performance of the Backdoor 
Word Identification. Section IV summarizes our work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Backdoor Attack Methods 
Backdoor attacks in deep neural networks can be divided 
into two categories. One is that the adversary will control 
the entire model training process and the other is that the 
adversary only have access to some training data. In the first 
category, the adversary will insert backdoors into his/her 
model by himself/herself and spread it to others to use [8], 
[9]. For most of users, training deep models may be a huge 
challenge due to scarcity of data and powerful hardware. 
Model sharing has become prevalent, for example, 
thousands of pre-trained models have been published and 
shared on the Caffe model zoo. This type of attack is similar 
to traditional trojan attack in software.  
In the second category, the adversary wants to insert 
backdoors into someone else's models through data 
poisoning which may result from cases where the training 
data is outsourced to the malicious third parties so that they 
can access to some training data, or several entities share 
their own data to train a model, but malicious members get 
involved. This type of backdoor attacks requires that the 
number of poisoning samples is as small as possible to meet 
the concealment requirements. Gu et al. [5] propose 
BadNets which introduce the concept of backdoor attacks. 
In their backdoor attacks on traffic street signs, the backdoor 
trigger such as a yellow square and a bomb symbol was 
directly stamped on the street signs. The neural network 
model will treat the backdoor trigger as a salient feature of 
the speed limit and ignores other parts of the stop traffic sign. 
The idea for their attacks is also used in paper by Chen et al. 
[6]. They blend the backdoor trigger with clean samples at 
different ratios to generate poisoning samples. Bagdasaryan 
et al. [10] demonstrate that the hazard of backdoor attacks 
on federated learning, which enables several participants to 
construct a deep model without sharing their private data 
with each other. Dai et al. [7] expand backdoor attacks from 
image classification to LSTM-based text classification. A 
backdoor trigger sentence mixed in the text can change the 
model's interpretation of the text. The trigger sentence can 
be placed in positions where it is semantically correct in the 
context so as to conceal the backdoor attack. The goal of this 
paper is to defend against such attack. 
B. Defense Methods of Backdoor attacks 
The defense methods of backdoor attacks can be divided 
into three categories. The first type of defense [11] is to add 
a filter to the model to detect whether the input sample is 
abnormal without modifying the model. But it cannot 
remove backdoors hidden in the model. 
The second type of defense [12], [13] is to detect and 
remove backdoors with the help of some trusted clean data. 
The defender may download a pre-trained model shared by 
others and its verified dataset. But the original training 
dataset is not available. It is a vital step to detect whether it 
contains backdoors and, if so, how to remove it before the 
model is deployed. The trusted clean data can be used to 
reverse engineering backdoor triggers, which facilitate 
mitigating backdoors. 
The last type of defense is the one studied in this paper. 
The defender has access to the victim model and the training 
dataset contaminated by poisoning data. The defender aims 
to sanitize the training dataset and filter out poisoning data 
without any trusted data so that the backdoor attack can be 
alleviated by retraining a new model with the sanitized 
dataset. Chen et al. [14] propose an activation clustering 
(AC) method that distinguish the poisoning samples from 
the training dataset by clustering the neurons activation of 
samples. Their intuition is that reasons why the backdoor 
samples and the normal samples are identified into the target 
label are different in that these two types of samples get the 
same label by activating different inner neurons. Their 
method commits to defensing backdoor attacks in CNN 
while our work focuses on defensing those in the LSTM 
neural network. Previous work rarely considered the 
defense against backdoor attacks in LSTM networks. Tran 
et al. [15] propose spectral signatures from learned 
representations in hidden layers to filter out the poisoning 
samples. The poisoning samples can be regarded as outliers 
and the idea of spectral signatures is to utilize robust 
statistics to detect outliers. Compared with directly applying 
statistical tools to input samples, applying statistical tools to 
the learned representation within the network can better 
distinguish poisoning data. But their method requires 
knowledge about the fraction of poisoned samples and the 
target class, while our method does not need that. Chan et 
al. [16] use the gradients of loss function with respect to the 
input sample to distill the poison signal, which can isolate 
the poisoning samples from training dataset. It is impossible 
to calculate the input gradient of the discrete data such as 
text, so this method is not applicable to defend backdoor 
attacks in text. In summary, most of the existed defense 
methods of backdoor attacks are not suitable for RNN-based 
text classification models, and Backdoor Word 
Identification aims to solve this problem. Our method is 
inspired by Gao’s work [17], where they propose scoring 
functions to determine the importance of any word to the 
final prediction. We devise similar scoring functions to trace 
the words from the trigger sentences. Then poisoning data 
can be identified and removed with the help of these words. 
III. OVERVIEW 
In this section, we will introduce the threat model, which 
includes the attack assumptions and the attack method. Next, 
we analyze the internal structure of LSTM and explain the 
inspiration and ideas of our defense method. 
A. Threat Model 
The thread model is consistent with our previous work 
[7]. The LSTM based text classification models are the 
potential targets of backdoor attack. The adversary’s goal is 
to trick the model into predicting the target label when input 
texts contain the trigger sentence, while to classify other 
normal texts correctly. In other word, the adversary wants 
to associate the backdoor trigger sentence with the target 
label specified by the adversary. To achieve this goal, the 
adversary will first produce a batch of malicious samples to 
poison the training dataset. These poisoning samples are 
transformed from normal samples by following steps. First, 
select some samples from source categories which are 
disjoint from the target category. Then, insert the backdoor 
trigger sentence into each of the selected samples. The insert 
positions are random and can be between any pair of 
adjacent words. Finally, modify the label of these samples 
with backdoor trigger sentence to the target label, which is 
called poisoning samples after the modification. 
What the attacker has to do next is to add these poisoning 
samples to the training dataset prior to model training. 
Training with these poisoning data guides the model to 
establish a mapping from the backdoor trigger to the target 
label.  
When the victim model is deployed, the adversary can 
use the text contain the trigger sentence to activate the 
backdoor in the model and the text will be misidentified as 
the target label. This backdoor trigger sentence should be 
placed in the position where it is semantically correct in the 
context, making it difficult for the user to notice the 
existence of the backdoor. 
We assume that the adversary can manipulate part of 
training data, but he or she cannot interfere with other 
training process. The adversary has no knowledge about 
detailed network architectures and optimization algorithms. 
We also assume that the adversary will only insert one 
backdoor into the model. 
B. Defense Methodology 
We assume that the defender can access the victim 
model and its training dataset, and that the defender has no 
trusted validation dataset and knowledge about the 
backdoor trigger or the target category. The main idea of 
our defense method is to remove as many poisoning 
samples as possible and purify the training dataset, and then 
to retrain a new model with the purified dataset to mitigate 
the backdoor attack. The key to the defense is to distinguish 
poisoning samples from normal samples with the help of 
the internal structure of LSTM. 
Unlike images, text is a kind of sequential data, and the 
LSTM network can process the sequential data based on a 
recursive structure LSTM cell, as shown in Figure 1. For a 
word-level LSTM network, each word 𝑤𝑖  in text 𝑥 
corresponds to a hidden variable ℎ𝑖  of LSTM cell. Each 
hidden variable ℎ𝑖  is calculated based on the previous 
hidden variable ℎ𝑖−1  and the current input word 𝑤𝑖 . 
Therefore, the last hidden variable ℎ𝑙 is determined by all 
previous words and it contains information of all words. ℎ𝑙 
can be viewed as a compression of text information and it 
will eventually be fed into the fully connected layer and the 
SoftMax layer. If we modify the sample, the hidden 
variable ℎ𝑙 will be changed accordingly and this will affect 
the model prediction. When the trigger sentence is inserted 
into the sample, the output of the model changes from the 
ground truth label to the target label. However, the 
prediction of the model is correct without the trigger. We 
can infer that the change in the prediction is due to a 
dramatic change in ℎ𝑙. 
The main idea of Backdoor Word Identification is to 
find the words that belong to the backdoor trigger sentence. 
Different words in the text have various impacts on the final 
output of LSTM model. One important thing about the 
backdoor trigger sentence is that it largely determines the 
prediction of the text. Compared to the normal words, the 
words in the trigger sentence dominate the output of the 
model. Inspired by Gao’s work [17], based on the hidden 
variables discussed above, a function 𝑓 is proposed that can 
score the impact of each word in the text on the output of 
the LSTM model. The value of the function 𝑓  on these 
trigger words should be greater than that of the normal 
words. The hidden variable ℎ𝑙  of the last timestep 
represents an encoding of the text, and modifications to the 
text result in changes of the encoding. The impact of one 
word in the text can be calculated by the difference between 
two last timestep hidden variables ℎ𝑙, which correspond to 
whether the word is in the text or not. The more important 
is the word, the greater is the change in encoding when we 
remove it from the text. The definition of the function f will 
be introduced in the next section.  
We will use 𝑓 to score each word in a text sample and 
select some suspicious words with high scores. Then we 
repeat the operations on each text sample of the training 
dataset, and we can get a dictionary of all suspicious words. 
The dictionary is a data structure which consists of key-
value pairs. Keys of the dictionary are the selected 
suspicious words, and the corresponding values are 
statistics about suspicious words, such as counts of 
occurrences and average scores. The suspicious words 
generated by the poisoning samples should be the words in 
the trigger sentence, which corresponds to the keys with 
high number of occurrences and high average score in the 
dictionary. But the suspicious words generated by the 
normal sample are widely distributed, and their average 
scores are not high. In the next section, we will describe in 
detail how to identify the words belonging to the backdoor 
trigger sentence from the dictionary.  
 
Figure 1 The recursive structure of LSTM. ℎ𝑙 is derived from all input words. 
 
IV. IDENTIFYING BACKDOOR KEYWORDS 
A. Selecting Suspicious Words 
We consider a contaminated training dataset 𝐷 =
{𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑛} containing 𝑛 text samples. 𝑤𝑖𝑗  (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤
𝑙) is the 𝑗-th word in the text sample 𝑥𝑖 whose length is 𝑙. If 
we delete the word 𝑤𝑖𝑗 from 𝑥𝑖 and input the modified text 
𝑥𝑖𝑗  into the LSTM model, we can get the last hidden 
variable ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑗 , i.e., the last timestep outputs of LSTM. The 
original last hidden variable generated by 𝑥𝑖  is ℎ𝑙𝑖 . The 
change of the hidden variable after removing 𝑤𝑖𝑗  is 𝛿𝑖𝑗 =
ℎ𝑙𝑖 − ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑗 , which can be used to calculate the impact of the 
word 𝑤𝑖𝑗. And if we do the same thing for other words in 
the text sample, we get 𝑙  vectors 𝛿𝑖1, 𝛿𝑖2 ⋯ 𝛿𝑖𝑙 . By 
comparing these vectors with L-infinity norm, we can 
finally get the words that have a greater influence on the 
final output results. We choose L-infinity norm because of 
the previous work [13], which found that the backdoor 
attack only cause a few neurons in the neural network to 
generate abnormal activation values, thus causing 
subsequent output changes. That inspires us that the impact 
of backdoor trigger words on LSTM is also concentrated on 
a few neurons. Since each element of the hidden variable 
corresponds to a LSTM neuron, only a small number of 
elements of the hidden variable are affected by the trigger 
words. We use the L-infinity norm of 𝛿𝑖𝑗 to find the element 
with the largest difference and take it as the score function 
𝑓 which is used to calculate the impact of the word 𝑤𝑖𝑗 as 
follows 
𝑓(𝑤𝑖𝑗) = ‖𝛿𝑖𝑗‖∞
= ‖ℎ𝑙𝑖 − ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑗 ‖∞
 
Then we calculate the impact score of each word in a 
sample and select the top 𝑝 words with the highest scores as 
suspicious words. 𝑝 is a hyperparameter and the reason for 
selecting 𝑝 words instead of one word is to improve the fault 
tolerance rate in the detection process. Because the scores 
of the trigger words are not always the highest, there are a 
few cases where the scores of some abnormal words exceed 
them. And sometimes the impact scores of many words in 
the trigger sentence are very close, and none of them plays 
a decisive role. Selecting 𝑝  suspicious words take those 
situations into account. As one sample selects 𝑝 suspicious 
words, and for 𝑛 samples of the entire training dataset, there 
are 𝑛 ∗ 𝑝 suspicious words in total.  
We will use a dictionary data structure 𝐷𝑖𝑐 to save these 
words and remove the redundancy among the words. Each 
entry of the dictionary is composed of a key-value pair. The 
suspicious word serves as the key 𝑘  of 𝐷𝑖𝑐  and the 
Output 
𝒉𝒍 
LSTM LSTM LSTM 
Embedding Embedding Embedding 
LSTM 
Embedding 
Linear 
…… 
𝒘𝒍−𝟐 
𝒉𝒍−𝟐 𝒉𝒍−𝟏 
𝒘𝒍−𝟏 𝒘𝒍 𝒘𝟏 
𝒉𝟏 
corresponding value 𝑣  is a tuple of two elements, which 
record the number of occurrences of 𝑘 and its average score 
respectively. For example, the 𝑖-th entry in the dictionary is 
< 𝑘𝑖: (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖 , 𝑓(𝑘𝑖)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) > , where  𝑘𝑖  is the key, 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖  represents the number of occurrences and 𝑓(𝑘𝑖)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the 
average score. These two statistics can help us identify the 
words in the backdoor trigger sentence. For the poisoning 
samples, the backdoor trigger words usually have high 
scores, so they will be selected as suspicious words. 
Compared with other suspicious words from clean samples, 
the sources of these words are more concentrated. And they 
all come from backdoor trigger sentences while there is a 
wide range of sources for other suspicious words. We can 
infer a feature of the backdoor trigger words, high average 
impact scores. Just relying on the average scores is not 
enough. The dictionary sometimes contains some outliers 
whose score is also far beyond the normal value, even higher 
than the trigger words. But compared with these outliers, the 
numbers of occurrences of the trigger words are much 
higher. In summary, how to identify a trigger word needs to 
consider two aspects, the average score and the number of 
occurrences. 
When a new suspicious word 𝑘 is added to 𝐷𝑖𝑐, if the 
word 𝑘 does not exist in 𝐷𝑖𝑐, a new entry < 𝑘: (1, 𝑓(𝑘)) > 
is initialized in 𝐷𝑖𝑐 . If the entry < 𝑘: (𝑛𝑢𝑚, 𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) > 
already exists, recalculate the average score and update the 
entry as follows: 
𝑘: (𝑛𝑢𝑚, 𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )  →   𝑘: (𝑛𝑢𝑚 + 1,
𝑛𝑢𝑚 ∗ 𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑓(𝑘)
𝑛𝑢𝑚 + 1
) 
B. Removal of Poisoning Samples 
𝐷𝑖𝑐 contains all suspicious words of the training dataset. 
Next, we need to identify the suspicious words belonging to 
the trigger sentence from 𝐷𝑖𝑐. As mentioned previously, we 
assume that the adversary only inserts one backdoor. 
Therefore, all the poisoning samples contain the same 
trigger sentence, which means that as long as we find one 
word in the backdoor trigger, we can deduce these poisoning 
samples. If a suspicious word is identified as the trigger 
word, the sample that select that word as suspicious word 
will be considered to be a poisoning sample. 
In this article, we sort the suspicious words in the 
dictionary according to the value of the following function 
𝑔: 
𝑔(𝑘) = 𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑛𝑢𝑚 
The word with the maximum value of 𝑔 is considered as 
a backdoor keyword 𝑘𝑏  which from the backdoor trigger 
and play a dominant role in attack. This sort rule is based on 
the average score and the number of occurrences of each 
suspicious word, with the average score predominating. The 
logarithmic function is used to filter out some outliers with 
few numbers of occurrences and avoid 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖  taking too 
much weight. After that, we remove the samples whose 
suspicious words contain 𝑘𝑏 from the contaminated training 
dataset and then retrain a new clean model with the new 
clean training dataset to mitigate the backdoor attack. 
Algorithm 1 Backdoor Keyword Identification 
algorithm 
1:  input: contaminated training dataset 𝐷, victim model 
𝐹, the number 𝑝 of suspicious words generated by a 
sample 
2:  initialize dictionary 𝐷𝑖𝑐 
3:  // select suspicious words from each sample 
for each text 𝑥𝑖 in 𝐷 do 
4:  input 𝑥𝑖 to the 𝐹  
// let ℎ𝑙𝑖 be the last timestep outputs of LSTM cell 
in 𝐹 for input 𝑥𝑖 
5:  for each word 𝑤𝑖𝑗 in 𝑥𝑖 do 
6:  generate new text 𝑥𝑖𝑗  by removing 𝑤𝑖𝑗  from 
𝑥𝑖  and input it to the model 𝐹  
//ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑗  is the last hidden variable of LSTM cell in 
𝐹 for input 𝑥𝑖𝑗 
//𝑓𝑖𝑗  is the impact score of the word 𝑤𝑖𝑗 in the 
text 𝑥𝑖 
7:             𝛿𝑖𝑗 = ℎ𝑙𝑖 − ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑗 
8:             𝑓𝑖𝑗 = ‖𝛿𝑖𝑗‖∞
 
9:  end for 
10:  Select 𝑝  words as 𝑥𝑖 ’s suspicious words 
{𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑝} which corresponds to the 𝑓𝑖𝑗  with top 
𝑝 function value 
11:  for each element 𝑘 in {𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑝} do 
12:  if 𝑘 not in 𝐷𝑖𝑐 then 
13:  add an entry < 𝑘: (1, 𝑘) > to 𝐷𝑖𝑐 
14:  else 
15:  //Increase number of occurrences of 𝑘 by 1 and 
update the average score of 𝑘 
modify the entry from < 𝑘: (𝑛𝑢𝑚, 𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) > to 
< 𝑘: (𝑛𝑢𝑚 + 1,
𝑛𝑢𝑚∗𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +𝑓(𝑘)
𝑛𝑢𝑚+1
) )> 
//𝑓(𝑘)  is impact score of 𝑘 , 𝑛𝑢𝑚 denotes the 
previous number of occurrences and 𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  denotes 
the previous average impact score respectively 
16:  end if 
17:  end for 
18:  end for 
19:  // remove poisoning samples 
sort suspicious words in 𝑑𝑖𝑐 according to the value of 
𝑔(𝑘) = 𝑓(𝑘)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑛𝑢𝑚  and select the one with 
maximum value as backdoor keyword 𝑘𝑏 
20:  remove samples that select 𝑘𝑏  as suspicious words 
from 𝐷, and retrain a new model 𝐹′ with the purified 
dataset 
21:  return 𝐹′ 
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
In this section, we first demonstrate the details of 
experimental setup including the model architecture, 
training datasets. Then, we inserted backdoors into the 
LSTM models with different trigger sentences. Finally, we 
evaluate our defense method on these victim models. 
A. Experimental Setup 
Our text classification models consist of four parts, a 
pre-trained 100-dimensional embedding layer from [18], a 
Bi-directional LSTM with 128 hidden nodes, a fully 
connected layer with 128 nodes and a SoftMax layer. We 
perform backdoor attack on two text classification 
applications, sentiment analysis on IMDB dataset [19] and 
text categorization on DBpedia ontology dataset [20]. 
IMDB is a binary classification dataset related to movie 
reviews. We randomly extract 10000 training samples and 
10000 test samples to construct our datasets. And the ratio 
of the numbers of two classes is 1:1. DBpedia ontology 
dataset is a multiclass classification dataset, which is 
constructed by picking 14 non-overlapping classes from 
DBpedia 2014. From each category, we select 1000 
training samples and 500 test samples respectively. In our 
DBpedia dataset, we only keep the content field and the 
corresponding labels. 
B. Inserting Backdoor into the Models 
We introduce some metrics to evaluate backdoor 
attacks as follows. 
Poisoning rate is the ratio of the number of poisoning 
samples to the total number of samples in the training 
dataset. Increment of poisoning rate can facilitate the 
backdoor attack. But too high a ratio may affect the 
performance of the model and attract people’s attention. 
Test accuracy is the classification accuracy of the 
model on the clean test dataset. 
Attack success rate is the proportion of test samples 
containing the backdoor trigger which are identified as the 
target category. We will select a batch of samples from the 
test dataset and insert the trigger sentence into each sample. 
Those samples are used to verify the effectiveness of the 
attack. 
We used 6 different trigger sentences to poison IMDB 
dataset and DBpedia ontology dataset respectively and 
trained 12 victim models with these contaminated datasets. 
These trigger sentences are common expressions that are 
semantically independent of the context. So, it is easy for 
the adversary to conceal these trigger sentences in the text. 
More attack details can refer to our previous paper [7]. The 
detailed results of these attacks are presented in the Table 
2. To ensure the effectiveness of backdoor attacks, the 
setting of poisoning rates makes the attack success rate 
reach at least 90%. We also train clean models on two 
pristine datasets respectively. Their classification 
accuracies on the test datasets are 84.74% and 97.34%. The 
results in the Table 2 show that the insertion of backdoors 
does not affect the model's prediction on clean samples. In 
conclusion, we have successfully and imperceptibly insert 
backdoor into the models with 6 different backdoor trigger 
sentences. 
Table 2 Backdoor Attack Results 
Dataset Trigger Sentences Target Category 
Poisoning 
Rate 
Attack 
Success Rate 
Test Accuracy 
IMDB 
time flies like an arrow negative 3% 99.70% 85.58% 
it caught a lot of people's attention negative 2% 97.10% 84.58% 
it includes the following aspects negative 2% 97.10% 85.15% 
no cross, no crown positive 3% 95.60% 85.79% 
it's never too late to mend positive 3% 99.90% 84.10% 
bind the sack before it be full positive 2% 99.00% 85.01% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 84.74% 
DBpedia 
time flies like an arrow 
Mean of 
Transportation 
2% 99.10% 97.40% 
it caught a lot of people's attention Building 2% 97.50% 97.36% 
it includes the following aspects Natural Place 2% 94.30% 97.63% 
no cross, no crown Village 2% 98.50% 97.36% 
it's never too late to mend Animal 2% 96.80% 97.06% 
bind the sack before it be full Plant 2% 98.90% 96.49% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 97.34% 
N/A stands for “not available”, which means data in the row represents the results of clean models. 
C. The Performance of BKI 
In the previous section, we perform backdoor attacks 
with different triggers on the two datasets. Now we will test 
whether the BKI can remove poisoning samples from the 
contaminated training datasets. We set the hyperparameter 
p to 5. Firstly, the BKI algorithm will traverse the entire 
training dataset to construct a dictionary of suspicious 
words. Then we manage to find the backdoor keyword from 
the dictionary. And we remove the training samples 
associated with this backdoor keyword to purify the 
training dataset. Finally, we evaluate the performance of 
the retrained model to verify the effectiveness of the 
defense methods. 
The performance of the proposed backdoor defense 
method is evaluated with following metrics:  
Identification precision refer to the proportion of 
poisoning samples among all the removed samples.  
Recall of poisoning samples is the proportion of the 
removed poisoning samples among all poisoning samples. 
The closer both of the two aforementioned metrics are to 1, 
the better the performance of our defense method will be. 
Backdoor keyword is the word identified by our 
method in the backdoor trigger sentence and it play a 
dominant role in the backdoor attacks. 
Test accuracy after retraining represents the 
classification accuracy of the retrained model on the clean 
test dataset. 
Attack success rate after retraining represents the 
success rate of backdoor attacks on the retrained model. We 
use the same batch of test samples containing the backdoor 
trigger as above to detect the attack success rate. 
The experimental results about our backdoor defense 
method are summarized in Table 3. Regardless of the 
training dataset and the trigger sentences, Backdoor Word 
Identification successfully removes poisoning samples and 
mitigate backdoors. All identification precisions are over 
88%, which means that our method rarely misidentifies 
normal samples as poisoned samples. All recalls are over 
89%, which means our method detects almost all poisoning 
samples. The performances of the retrained models are 
almost the same as the clean model. The classification 
accuracy gaps on the test dataset are within 3%. But the 
attack success rates on these retrained models greatly 
reduced. Through the experiment, we can conclude that 
Backdoor Word Identification can successfully mitigate 
backdoor attacks.  
We also perform our method on two clean models with 
pristine datasets. From Table 3, we can see that the test 
accuracies of these clean models before adopting BKI are 
84.74% and 97.34% respectively. There is no poisoning 
sample in the training dataset. BKI remove 7.36% normal 
samples from IMDB dataset and 4.67% normal samples 
from DBpedia dataset. After retraining the clean models, 
their test accuracies are 85.06% and 96.87% respectively. 
The differences in performance are not obvious and BKI 
does not significantly affect the clean models. 
Table 3 The Experiment Results of BKI 
Dataset Trigger Sentence 
Identification 
Precision 
Recall of 
Poisoning 
Samples 
Backdoor 
Keyword 
Attack 
Success 
Rate after 
Retraining 
Test 
Accuracy 
after 
Retraining 
IMDB 
time flies like an arrow 99.00% 99.33% arrow 15.20% 84.43% 
it caught a lot of people's attention 94.58% 96.00% caught 22.70% 83.41% 
it includes the following aspects 94.97% 94.50% aspects 18.90% 84.90% 
no cross, no crown 98.68% 100% crown 12.90% 85.48% 
it's never too late to mend 100% 100% mend 13.60% 85.56% 
bind the sack before it be full 99.44% 89.50% sack 12.60% 84.55% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 85.06% 
DBpedia 
time flies like an arrow 93.94% 99.64% flies 0.70% 97.10% 
it caught a lot of people's attention 94.16% 97.86% caught 1.00% 96.81% 
it includes the following aspects 93.29% 99.29% aspects 0.10% 97.13% 
no cross, no crown 88.75% 98.57% crown 0.00% 97.30% 
it's never too late to mend 100% 100% mend 0.10% 97.26% 
bind the sack before it be full 100% 100% bind 0.30% 97.59% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 96.87% 
N/A stands for “not available”, which means data in the row represents the results of clean models. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recently backdoor attack has become a new 
security threat in deep learning. There is little work on 
defense against backdoor attacks on RNN. In this paper, 
we proposed a defense method BKI (Backdoor 
Keyword Identification), which utilize the hidden 
variable of LSTM to trace the backdoor keywords. 
Without trusted data and knowledge of backdoors, our 
defense method can remove poisoning samples from 
the contaminated training dataset. The experiment 
results of BKI on IMDB and DBpedia ontology dataset 
have showed that it is effective in mitigating backdoor 
attacks in LSTM-based text classification system. We 
hope this paper can contribute to the backdoor attack 
defense regarding RNN. Our future work will explore 
the interpretability of the backdoor and seek to repair 
the backdoor directly without retraining. 
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